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LIST OF PARTIES 
This action was originally filed against Life-Line, a non-profit corporation, and 
two officers, Vernon Utley and James Smith. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
granted in favor of the defendants included all three defendants. 
The status of Vernon Utley and James Smith with respect to this appeal is not 
clear, but it is assumed that Messrs Utley and Smith are not parties to the appeal as Mr. 
Hansen affirmatively states on page 2 of his brief that the caption shows all parties to the 
subject appeal and such caption does not include the names of Smith and Utley. The 
Docketing Statement in this appeal also is silent as to whether Smith and Utley are parties 
to the appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdictional statement of the appellant is not disputed. This court has 
jurisdiction under §78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) Appellee hereby indicates that it is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the Appellant. 
Appellant dwells upon the law governing the resolution of appeals from summary 
judgment and fails to articulate any substantive legal issue from the issues presented by 
the granting of summary judgment. 
The substantive issue presented is whether the court ruled correctly as a matter of 
law Mr. Hansen was not an at will employee, thereby leaving him without factual 
foundation to support the first and second causes of action. 
This court should resolve this issue by viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the Appellant and by reviewing the trial court 
decision without deference to the legal conclusions made. Neiderhauser Builders & 
Development Corp. v. Cambpell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellee identifies no controlling rules, regulations, statues or constitutional 
provisions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case 
This is an action by an attorney that was an employee of a company He also 
served as a member of the board of trustees of that company Plaintiff brought four 
causes of action The first was for wrongfully terminating his employment The second 
was for not giving him a pay raise The third alleged the corporation acted in an ultra 
vires manner The fourth cause of action was for gender discrimination 
B. The Course of Proceedings 
The Complaint was filed on January 21,1998 R, p 1 
After some discovery was conducted, defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on May 6, 1998 Plaintiff stipulated to dismissal to the third and fourth causes 
of action but proceeded to make argument in opposition to the motion on the first and 
second causes of action R, p 114, 116 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
This case was assigned to Judge Judith Atherton The Motion for Summary 
Judgment was heard and ruled upon by Judge Ann Boyden Judge Boyden granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all causes of action R , p 114 Judge 
Atherton actually signed the final Order Granting Summary Judgment R , p 116 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellee first argues that the brief of the Appellant fails to meet the standards 
required for a brief That is, a reading of the brief shows that there is virtually no 
substantive argument and the Appellee is left to speculate as to what issues are presented 
and what arguments ought to be made. This defect alone justifies denial of the appeal. 
In case the court should reach the merits of the argument presented, Appellee next 
shows that the trial court ruled correctly in holding that there was insufficient evidence to 
overcome the presumption that Mr. Hansen was an at will employee of Lifeline, Inc. 
With an at will status, Hansen's employment was properly terminated and no cognizable 
claim had been presented to the court. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant Fails to Submit Argument as Required 
As has been explained in the introductory material of this brief, this appeal comes 
to the court from the granting of a Summary Judgment dismissing two causes of action 
alleging Mr. Hansen was wrongfully terminated from his employment. 
A reading of the Appellant's brief shows that the argument, beginning on page 9, 
is to state the conclusion that summary judgment was not appropriate and then recite at 
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length quotations from a variety of cases stating the standard of review for summary 
judgment. 
Appellant then avoids his responsibility to present cogent argument by stating on 
page 14 that until a hearing is held facts cannot be developed. There is no attempt to 
marshal facts in his favor or to even explain why the trial court was incorrect in its ruling. 
The rules governing the presentation of argument on appeal are clear and long 
settled. In Crossroads Plaza Association v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court made clear that issues presented on appeal should be clearly defined with 
citation to pertinent authority and that it is not appropriate for parties to just "dump" the 
burden of argument and research on the court. 
This court followed a similar line of reasoning in Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 
(Utah App. 1998), wherein the court rejected an appeal where the Appellant failed to 
provide any analysis or legal authority but just made a bare assertion that this court should 
adopt a certain California jury instruction. See Also, Butler, Crockett & Walsh 
Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995), 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court refused to review certain arguments on appeal where 
there was a failure to cite to legal authority and to make argument to show where the trial 
court decision was wrong. 
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The structure of the brief of the Appellant here is so vague as to leave the Appellee 
to have to guess as to what substantive issues and arguments are to be considered. The 
bald assertion that the trial court had a lot of facts and should hold a trial jumps over an 
analysis of what facts were available to the trial court and what consideration the court 
should have given them. 
The fact is that the Appellant's brief does not show at all where the trial court went 
wrong. This appeal should be denied for the failure of the Appellant to meet the most 
fundamental requirement recited in Rule 24(a)(9) that an argument be presented 
including contentions and reasons of the Appellant on the issues presented. As this court 
has stated before, extensive quotations from numerous case authorities cannot substitute 
for the development of appellate arguments tied to the record. West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). The appeal should be denied. 
B. Mr. Hansen Was an At Will Employee as a Matter of Law 
Hansen presented four causes of action in his Complaint. The third and fourth 
causes were dismissed by stipulation, so only the first and second were placed in issue by 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and the resulting ruling. A copy of the Complaint is 
in the addendum to this brief. 
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The first cause of action could best be labeled as one for breach of contract for 
wrongful termination in that Mr. Hansen worked as a staff attorney for the defendant 
corporation and alleged that when his employment was terminated that he was not an at 
will employee. 
The second cause of action was a claim that Mr. Hansen had been promised a raise 
which he did not receive and which was lost by the wrongful termination. One could 
argue that this is more a damage issue than a separate cause of action, but such discussion 
would be academic only as the claim fails for reasons explained next. 
The Third District Court found that there was a legal presumption of at will 
employment which had not been overcome by any facts presented. Logically, it followed 
that the question of any raise with respect to the second cause of action was moot once it 
was determined the termination was legal. In the language of Rule 56, the claims failed 
for a lack of any genuine issue of material fact as to whether an at will relationship 
existed. R.,p.l 16. 
The general rule in Utah is that an employment relationship is presumed to be at 
will. Ryan v. Dan s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998); Fox v. MCI 
Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). The burden is on the terminated 
employee to rebut the presumption of at will employment by showing the existence of 
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communications sufficiently definite to induce reasonable belief that the employment is 
other than an at will arrangement. Sorensen v. Kennecott - Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 
1141 (UtahApp. 1994). 
Lifeline showed in its Motion for Summary Judgment that if you took the facts 
claimed only by Hansen, such facts were insufficient to overcome the presumption of at 
will employment as a matter of law. R., p 44. 
Specifically, Hansen claims that he was on a medical leave until a December 9, 
1997, meeting with Vernon Utley and James Smith. Hanson claims he was told he could 
come back to work and that he would be working for the inflationary equivalent in 1998 
dollars of $9.00 per hour in 1990. Hansen affirmatively stated in his deposition that those 
were all of the terms and conditions of the oral agreement of employment. R., pp. 51-52, 
57. 
Lifeline argued and the district court correctly recognized that even if the Hansen 
version of the employment agreement is accurate, Lifeline was still free to terminate 
Hansen immediately after the agreement was made. There was nothing agreed about a 
definite term of employment. There was only, under the Hansen view, a discussion that 
Hansen could return from a medical leave and that he could have a raise. Lifeline was 
free to terminate the employment relationship at will. 
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An examination of the Hansen response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
found at R., p.91, shows that he presented no facts which bear on the agreed term of 
employment. Hansen, in an affidavit, responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
gives a lengthy explanation of what his work duties were and how well he believes he 
performed them. R., p.94. His affidavit sheds no light upon there being any employment 
relationship other than an at will relationship. He identified no facts or promises made to 
him that would overcome the presumption of at will employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee asks this court to recognize that with no substantive arguments 
presented in the Appellant's brief, that it is difficult to anticipate what issues and 
arguments ought to be presented. However, as has been pointed out, a simple review of 
the material pertaining to the summary judgment before the Third District Court shows 
that Appellant has not been able to show that he has a legal foundation for the first and 
second causes of action. The trial court appropriately dismissed those causes of action 
and this court should affirm that dismissal. 
This court is respectfully requested to affirm the summary judgment of the Third 
District Court. 
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DATED this _S day of April, 1999. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, PC. 
GREGORYS ADDERS 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Plaintiffs Complaint Without Exhibits 
ROBERT B. HANSEN #1344 
Pro Se 
838 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 322-1796 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, individually 
and as a Trustee of Defendant, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIFE-LINE, a non-profit 
corporation, VERNON UTLEY, 
and JAMES SMITH, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Civil No. 
q%O<\0OW} ML 
Judge' 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
VENUE 
This suit is filed in Salt Lake County rather than Davis 
County as all the individual parties reside there or south thereof 
and is thus a more convenient forum. 
STANDING 
Plaintiff disclosed at a meeting of the Board of Trustees on 
January 2 0, 1998, that he proposed to file this suit unless the 
Defendant corporation established the amount of reasonable compen-
sation for its officers and employees and was summary voted out as 
a trustee in violation of the by-laws of said corporation which 
require prior notice for such action. 
sfcesoi 
FIRST CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and for a First Claim against 
Defendant alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant is a non-profit corporation engaged in the 
business of treating young people who are addicted to alcohol, 
drugs, or sex, all or some of them. 
2. The treatment model is patterned after A.A. with modifi-
cation primarily pioneered by Dr. Miller Newton in "Kids" program 
and the book Not My Kid. 
3. Plaintiff is an attorney who has a proprietary interest 
in Defendant's program due to his commitment to work at least 2 0 
hours per week at a time when Defendants finances were precarious 
at best in the year 1990. 
4. Plaintiff worked at least 20 hours on the average for 
Defendant's program as an attorney, educational coordinator, or any 
other tasks assigned to him by the then Director, Kim De Lamar, and 
since by Vernon Utley until sometime in March 1997 when Director 
Utley asked him to take a four-month medical leave of absence due 
to certain health problems Plaintiff was then experiencing, which 
hospitalized him twice in 1997. He recovered prior to June 30, 
1997. 
5. Thereafter said director, behind Plaintiff's back, made 
the following report to Plaintiff's son William Hansen: 
"D. Termination from Part-Time Job 
Recently Mr. Hansen lost his job at Lifeline, a program 
to help juveniles with behavior problems. Vern Utley, the 
Director of Lifeline, explained that during the last few years 
Mr. Hansen has continually gone downhill and has been unable 
to fulfill even the most basic of his responsibilities, to the 
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point where it was necessary to terminate him for medical 
reasons. Specifically, Mr. Hansen repeatedly fell asleep 
during staff meetings, came to work in a disheveled state, and 
was often forgetful and/or confused." 
6. The aforesaid report was the basis, or one of them, for 
the Utah State Bar initiating disability procedures against Plain-
tiff with the objective of having him disqualified from practice 
due to disability. 
7. On December 5, 1997, Plaintiff filed with Defendant at 
its meeting of the Board of Trustees on that date a Notice for 
Claim for $6,000 for wrongful termination with a stated intention 
to sue for more if the claim was not paid. 
8. On the following day, both the Director and his assis-
tant, James Smith, called Plaintiff and advised him that he had no 
claim for wrongful termination because he had never been 
terminated. 
9. Before concluding the phone call referred to above, the 
parties thereto made an appointment to discuss the matter in person 
at Defendant's office in North Salt Lake on December 8, 1997, at a 
fixed time. 
10. At the meeting referred to above, Plaintiff was again 
told that he had never been terminated and that he did not have to 
sue to get his job back. Mr. Utley said, "You can come back 
anytime you want." 
11. On December 9, 1997, at 10:30 a.m., Plaintiff went to 
Defendant's office prepared to work. Director Utley called shortly 
thereafter and said it was "premature" for Plaintiff to start to 
work as they had to "work out the details" first. Plaintiff 
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reminded the said Utley that the only detail that needed to be 
agreed to pursuant to discussions on the previous day was the 
adjustment of the $9.00 per hour in 1990 to the current C.P.I, 
value of the comparable number of dollars and that can readily be 
ascertained later. Plaintiff was told that Utley would call him on 
Thursday morning (December 14). No call was made then. 
12. On December 15, 1997, Plaintiff talked with Jim Smith and 
a copy of the letter to him dated December 17, 1997, is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." 
13. The response to the Exhibit "A" letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B". 
14. Defendant has never given notice to Plaintiff that his 
employment would be terminated and for what reason and an opportu-
nity to refute the reasons therefor. 
15. Plaintiff is not an at-will employee and, even if he was, 
he has a constitutionally protected interest in that employment 
under the above circumstances so that summary discharge without due 
process is illegal and wrongful. 
SECOND CLAIM 
1. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every allegation 
of his First Claim by reference. 
2. An oral agreement of employment was entered into on the 
8th day of December, 1997, which obligated Plaintiff to perform at 
least 2 0 hours of service each week at tasks assigned by Defendant 
through its Director for $ * per hour (which is equivalent of 
$9.00 per hour adjusted to value of 1998 dollars compared to 1990 
dollars). 
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3 . Plaintiff is owed $ * less mitigation of 
damages for services he has been ready, willing, and able to 
perform to date and for $ * less mitigation of damages for 
every two-week period hereafter as long as he is physically and 
mentally able to work as before. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for $60,000.00 for his First Claim 
and for the damages he proves at trial as to his Second Claim. 
THIRD CLAIM 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for a third claim alleges as 
follows: 
1. The corporate defendant is a non-profit corporation 
incorporated pursuant to Chapter 6 of Title 16 U.C.A. 1953. 
2. Plaintiff is a trustee of said corporation and brings 
this claim pursuant to Section 16-6-23 U.C.A. 1953. 
3. Said corporation is now paying and since about the middle 
of 1996 has paid the individual Defendants unreasonable compensa-
tion and proposes to do so in the future. 
4. Plaintiff contends that Defendant corporation is acting 
ultra vires with respect to the individual Defendants and an 
injunction should issue to prohibit the payment of unreasonable 
compensation henceforth in the future and make refunds to the 
parents who have overpaid as a result of those acts. 
*Need report from the University of Utah Bureau of Economics before 
these sums can be set forth by amendment. 
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5. The Articles of Corporation of the said corporation 
provide that its purpose inter alia is to provide charitable 
services. 
6. No charitable services are now being provided by said 
Defendant. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the amount of reasonable 
compensation be ascertained in this proceeding and that Defendants 
be enjoined from paying compensation in excess thereof and that the 
excess be refunded in a class action herein for the sums due to 
parents who have been overcharged. 
FOURTH CLAIM 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for a fourth claim alleges as 
follows: 
1. The Defendant corporation is engaged in interstate 
commerce and is subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act; also to 
Equal Pay Act of 1963. 
2. Defendant corporation has violated the 1st aforesaid law 
with respect to its provision prohibiting sexual discrimination. 
3. Plaintiff has standing to enjoin future violations of 
said law as he is a trustee of said corporation and as such may be 
vulnerable personally to any aggrieved female. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Defendant corporation be 
enjoined from any future violations of the law cited above and that 
Plaintiff be awarded reasonable attorney's fees for bringing this 
action and for his costs of court incurred herein. 
6 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
I hereby demand a jury trial. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 1998. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Pro Se 
i\ f. <* t\ /> i*« 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this (f day of April, 1999, to the 
following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
838- 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
GREGORVJ^SANDERS 
11 
